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Cues to intention bias action 
perception toward the most 
efficient trajectory
Katrina L. McDonough  1, Matthew Hudson  1,2 & patric Bach1
Humans interpret others’ behaviour as intentional and expect them to take the most energy-efficient 
path to achieve their goals. Recent studies show that these expectations of efficient action take the form 
of a prediction of an ideal “reference” trajectory, against which observed actions are evaluated, distorting 
their perceptual representation towards this expected path. Here we tested whether these predictions 
depend upon the implied intentionality of the stimulus. Participants saw videos of an actor reaching 
either efficiently (straight towards an object or arched over an obstacle) or inefficiently (straight towards 
obstacle or arched over empty space). The hand disappeared mid-trajectory and participants reported 
the last seen position on a touch-screen. As in prior research, judgments of inefficient actions were biased 
toward efficiency expectations (straight trajectories upwards to avoid obstacles, arched trajectories 
downward towards goals). In two further experimental groups, intentionality cues were removed by 
replacing the hand with a non-agentive ball (group 2), and by removing the action’s biological motion 
profile (group 3). Removing these cues substantially reduced perceptual biases. Our results therefore 
confirm that the perception of others’ actions is guided by expectations of efficient actions, which are 
triggered by the perception of semantic and motion cues to intentionality.
Humans see others’ behaviour as purposeful and goal directed1–4. A key signature of this “intentional stance”5 is 
the assumption that other people generally act rationally: they take the most energy-efficient path to achieve their 
goal, and expend additional energy only when an obstacle has to be overcome3,6. This simple heuristic of action 
efficiency arises early in development and allows children to attribute intentionality to observed behaviours, even 
when carried out by inanimate objects7–9. Human infants (and some non-human primates) show surprise, for 
example, when actors that are believed to be intentional violate these assumptions, such as when they do not try 
to avoid an obstacle or exert additional unnecessary energy to reach their goal4,10. Once established, this simple 
heuristic may form a stepping-stone for more sophisticated abilities for reasoning about others4,11. For example, 
observing an inefficient action (e.g. reaching directly towards an object despite an obstacle in the way) can help 
people realize that others act according to beliefs and not objective reality (i.e. they may not have sight of the 
obstacle), forming the basis of a prototypical theory of mind.
We have argued that these expectations of efficient action are, to some extent, perceptually represented, in 
the form of an ideal “reference” trajectory that a rational actor would take through a given environment, against 
which observed actions can be judged12,13. This proposal emerges from recent predictive processing accounts of 
social perception12,14–17 which argue that perception of others’ actions – like perception in general – is always 
hypothesis-driven. Any assumption about the external world (and the people within it) is translated into the 
perceptual input that would result from such a state. These expectations of future input can guide perception and 
be tested against actual stimulation18–20. In non-social perception, such expectations explain several visual illu-
sions (e.g., dress illusion21), the switch between different bi-stable percepts22, or why the same objects can appear 
convex or concave depending on prior assumptions about light sources23. In social perception, simply attributing 
a goal to another person could similarly elicit predictions about how this individual would realise such a goal, 
specifying which action they may soon carry out14–16,24,25 (for theoretical arguments, see26,27). The principle of 
efficient action can make a direct contribution here, specifying the ideal “reference” trajectory that achieves the 
actor’s goals with minimum energy expenditure, given the current environmental constraints, such as potential 
obstacles in the way12,26.
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In a recent series of studies, we attempted to reveal these expectations of efficient action13. These studies relied 
on the well-established phenomenon that the uncertainty during motion perception is perceptually sharpened 
using top-down information28,29, filling in missing information30–32 in a predictive manner33,34. The resulting per-
ceptual biases can be reliably measured by suddenly removing the moving object from view, and asking partici-
pants to report its disappearance point, either on a touch screen35–37 or by comparing it to probe stimuli presented 
shortly after38–42. In such a paradigm, people generally over-estimate the movement they have seen, reporting 
the moving stimulus to have disappeared further along its trajectory than it really did (i.e. the representational 
momentum effect38,39). These displacements have been shown to not only reflect a simple extrapolation of motion 
based on the previously seen trajectory43, but also prior knowledge about it’s causes, such as how the motion 
would be affected by one’s own actions44, by physical forces such as friction or gravity45, or the most likely behav-
iours of the other person41,42,46–48.
In the case of observed actions, the perceptual biases reflect the predictions derived from the assumption of 
efficient action13. In a recent series of experiments, participants observed a hand starting to reach for an object 
with a straight or arched trajectory. The actions were either efficient (reaching straight when the path was clear or 
arched over an obstacle) or inefficient (straight towards an obstacle or arched over empty space). The movement 
disappeared before it was completed and participants reported the hand’s last seen position on a touch screen, or 
by comparing it to probe stimuli presented immediately after. Both measures revealed that perceptual judgements 
were reliably biased by expectations of efficient action. Straight reaches were reported to have reached higher 
when an obstacle was blocking its path, in line with the expectation that the hand would soon lift to avoid it. 
Conversely, high arched reaches were reported lower when no obstacle was present, and corrected towards the 
straighter, more energy-efficient trajectory. These biases were present automatically, but increased when partici-
pants explicitly predicted–prior to action onset–the most efficient trajectory through the scene, or when attention 
was drawn to the environmental constraints. Moreover, they could be disrupted by dynamic visual noise masks 
presented directly after stimulus offset, suggesting that the biases emerge during ongoing perception or directly 
after the sudden offset, when the visual system “fills in” the expected future path49,50.
Together, these results indicate that the teleological stance is at least partly perceptually represented, providing 
an ideal reference trajectory that informs the action that was indeed perceived. Here, we test on what stimulus 
features these predictions of efficient action depend. In children, as well as in adults, intention attribution – and 
the resulting surprise when seeing an inefficient action–depends on the presence of cues to intention51–53, such as 
seeing an agentive stimulus (such as a hand relative to a ball54), or observing movements with biological motion 
trajectories55–59. If such cues indeed trigger attributions of intentionality to others, and the expectation of efficient 
action is tied to such intentionality attribution, then they should also determine to what extent perceptual biases 
towards efficient actions are observed.
In the first experimental group, we replicated the original experiment by Hudson and colleagues13, in which 
participants saw efficient and inefficient reach trajectories (arched/straight over an obstacle vs. empty space) and 
indicated the hand’s last location after it had suddenly disappeared on a touch screen. In two further experimental 
groups, we progressively removed intentional cues. First, as in prior research on infant intention attribution54, we 
replaced the hand with a non-agentive stimulus – a ball –, which however followed the same characteristic biolog-
ical motion trajectories and profiles as the hands in the first experimental group, showing the classical bell-shaped 
velocity profile of reaches towards objects60. Second, humans are sensitive to motion cues that distinguish the 
intentional biological agents from inanimate objects, such as self-propulsion and change of direction55,58, or a 
trajectory and speed of movement that is similar to one’s own movement56,57,59. In a third group, participants 
therefore saw the same ball, but it did not now follow a biological motion profile, removing all kinematic cues to 
intention. If biases toward efficient action emerge from cues that signal intentionality, then they should be sub-
stantially reduced in group 2, and further reduced in group 3, as cues to intentionality are removed.
Method
participants. Eighty-two participants took part in the experiment: twenty-nine participants in group 1 
(hand stimuli, mean age = 21 years, SD = 4.7, 25 females), twenty-seven in group 2 (balls with biological motion, 
mean age = 20 years, SD = 4.1, 21 females), and twenty-six in group 3 (balls with non-biological motion, mean 
age = 21 years, SD = 4.2, 20 females). Nine additional participants (two from group 1, three from group 2, four 
from group 3) were excluded based on previously established exclusion criteria (see Results). All participants in 
all groups were tested in the same three-week period. Both the gender mix and age distribution did not differ 
between groups (ps > 0.39). All participants were right-handed, had normal/corrected-to-normal vision, gave 
informed consent, and were recruited from the University of Plymouth or the wider community for course credit 
or payment. The study was approved by the University of Plymouth’s ethics board, in line with the ESRC and the 
Declaration of Helsinki. A power analysis revealed that a sample size of 26 provides 0.80 power to detect two-
sided within-subjects effects in each of the group with Cohen’s d = 0.57. Our prior study investigating the same 
effect13 (“report obstacle” condition) and pilot data revealed consistently larger effect sizes, d = 0.76 to d = 1.29. 
For the between-subjects effects, a power analysis revealed that a sample size of 26 per group provides 0.80 power 
to detect effects in either direction with Cohen’s d = 0.79. This should provide enough power to detect reductions 
of the original effect to about 40% of the original size (assuming that standard deviations remain the same).
Apparatus. Presentation (NeuroBS) software was used to present the experiment via a HP EliteDisplay 
S230tm 23-inch widescreen (1920 × 1080) Touch Monitor. Verbal responses were recorded with Presentation’s 
sound threshold logic via a Logitech PC120 combined microphone and headphone set.
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stimuli. Example stimuli can be seen in Fig. 1A. To derive a set of stimuli of efficient actions, videos were 
filmed of an arm at rest to the right of the screen, which then reached for one of four objects (an apple, a packet 
of crisps, a glue stick, or a stapler) on the left of the screen. The reaches were either directed straight for the target 
object (Straight/Efficient), or arched over one of three obstacles (an iPad, lamp or pencil holder; Arched/Efficient). 
Each video clip was then converted into individual frames, and the first 22 from frame 1 (initial rest position) to 
22 (mid-way through the action) were used as stimuli. For each efficient action, an inefficient action sequence was 
created by digitally removing the obstacles from the Arched/Efficient videos (Arched/Inefficient), or by inserting 
the obstructing objects into the Straight/Efficient videos, (Straight/Inefficient). The inefficient actions were there-
fore identical to the efficient actions in terms of movement kinematics, and differed only by the presence/absence 
of the obstacle. Finally, response stimuli were created by taking one frame from each action sequence and digitally 
removing the actor’s arm from the scene, so that only the objects and background remained. Presenting this frame 
immediately after the action sequence gave the impression of the hand disappearing from the scene, and partici-
pants indicated the last seen location of the tip of the index finger on this frame with a touch response on screen.
For experimental group 2 (balls with biological motion), the forty videos of hand movements used in exper-
imental group 1 were digitally manipulated so that the actor’s hand was replaced with a ball, coloured using the 
same tones as the hand. The ball was the same size as the tip of the index finger that participants had to touch in 
experimental group 1 (30 px. diameter) and was positioned at the same coordinates in each frame. An additional 
frame was created by positioning the ball mid-air before the first frame (where the ball contacts the table) creating 
an illusory “bounce” motion, providing a realistic context for the ball movement in order to reduce impressions 
of self-propelled movement that could also cue the observer that the motion is intentional61.
For Experimental group 3 (balls with non-biological motion), the forty videos from group 2 were digitally 
manipulated so that the ball now appeared to move in a straight line and at a constant speed after the bounce 
frame, eliminating the biological motion profile. To ensure that comparability of disappearance points between 
experimental groups, the line of best fit was calculated through the last four frames of each sequence of experi-
mental group 1 (i.e. all possible disappearance points). The constant speed of the ball was created by recalculating 
the Y coordinates at equal distances along this line, between the first and last frame.
Figure 1. Stimulus conditions and trial sequence. The stimulus conditions used in all three experimental 
groups are depicted in Panel A. The four panels show the hand in the starting position and the possible action 
trajectories. These Action Trajectories  were either straight or arched and were rendered either efficient or 
inefficient by the presence or absence of an obstructing object. Panel B depicts an equivalent example of a 
Straight/Inefficient trial in the Biological Ball group (top) and the Non-Biological Ball group (bottom). The 
white markers depict the disappearance point of the index finger tip/ball in each of the four final frames. Panel 
C shows an example of a trial sequence in the Arched/Efficient condition of group 1. This trial sequence is 
equivalent across all experimental groups.
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procedure. An example trial sequence can be seen in Fig. 1B. Participants completed four blocks of 48 trials 
in which each condition was presented an equal amount of times (Straight/Efficient, Straight/Inefficient, Arched/
Efficient, Arched/Inefficient). At the start of each trial, participants saw an instruction to “Hold the spacebar”, 
to which they pressed the spacebar with their right hand and kept it depressed. This ensured that they did not 
track the observed motion with their finger and could only initiate their response once the action sequence had 
disappeared. Participants then saw the first frame of the action sequence as a static image (the hand at rest in 
experimental group 1 and the “bouncing ball” frame in experimental groups 2 and 3) and were required to say 
“yes” into the microphone if there was an obstructing object present, and “no” if there was not.
The action sequence began 1000 ms after a verbal response had been detected. Every third frame of the action 
sequence was presented for 80 ms each, with a randomly selected sequence length of 5, 6, 7 or 8 frames (e.g. trials 
with a length of 8 frames showed frames 1-4-7-10-13-16-19-22). The final frame was then immediately replaced 
with the response frame, which showed the same scene without the moving object, creating the impression that 
the hand/ball had simply disappeared. Participants released the spacebar and, with their right hand, touched the 
screen where they thought the final position of the tip of the observed index finger was in group 1, or the final ball 
position in groups 2 and 3. As soon as a response was registered, the next trial began.
Note that the presentation of every third frame of the videos resulted in illusory “apparent” motion between 
the steps in the trajectory62. Such non-smooth motion retains the relevant characteristics of intentional biological 
motion (e.g. parabolic path, bell-shaped velocity profile) and provides ideal conditions to measure predictive 
influences in motion perception, which are larger with apparent motion than smooth motion63. This is in line with 
the notion that top-down influences that govern everyday perception become apparent the more the bottom-up 
sensory input becomes ambiguous or uncertain (e.g. through bi-stable images64; visual noise65). For motion, 
non-smooth step-wise presentation is assumed to disrupt low-level motion detectors, prompting a stronger 
weighting of top-down influences that compensate and “fill in” the intervening steps in the trajectory30,32,66.
Results
Data filtering was identical to our original study13. In all three experimental groups, trials were excluded if the 
correct response procedure was not followed (e.g. lifting the spacebar too early; 3.5%), or if response initia-
tion or execution times were shorter than 200 ms or more than 3 SDs above the sample mean (2.2%, Initiation: 
mean = 393.7 ms, SD = 173.3; Execution: mean = 571.9 ms, SD = 203.3). Participants were excluded if too few tri-
als remained after trial exclusions (<50% valid trials, 3 participants), if the distance between the real and selected 
positions exceeded 3 SD of the sample mean (mean = 39.9 pixels, SD = 18.9, 2 participants excluded), or if the 
correlation between the real and selected positions was more than 3 SD below the median r value (X axis: median 
r = 0.940, SD = 0.041; Y axis: median r = 0.908, SD = 0.063, 4 participants excluded).
Analysis was conducted on the predictive perceptual bias by subtracting the real final coordinates of the tip of 
the index finger/ball from the participant’s selected coordinates on each trial. This resulted in separate “difference” 
scores along the X and Y axis where positive X and Y scores represented a rightward and upward displacement 
respectively, and negative X and Y scores represented a leftward and downward displacement respectively. A score 
of 0 on both axes indicated that the participant selected the real final position exactly. These difference scores 
were entered into a 2 × 2 × 3 ANOVA for the X and Y axis separately, with Trajectory (straight vs arched) and 
Efficiency (efficient vs inefficient) as repeated-measures factors, and Experimental group as a between-subjects 
factor.
The data from the original experiments13, as well as further pilot studies in our lab, have shown that expec-
tations of efficient action primarily induce biases on the Y-axis, but not the X-axis. This is consistent with the 
view that rather than viewing the current trajectory relative to the trajectory that was initially predicted (e.g. an 
arched trajectory when an obstacle was present), expectations of action efficiency reflect expectations about how 
the current trajectory will further develop. In other words, when seeing a straight reach towards an obstacle, one 
expects the hand to be merely lifted upwards to avoid the obstacle (rather than it being also displaced backwards 
to its corresponding location had it followed the arched trajectory from the outset). Similarly, when seeing an 
arched reach over empty space one expects the current reach would straighten downwards towards the goal object 
(rather than also being displaced forwards to where the hand would be had it followed the alternative straight tra-
jectory). If the current results replicate this established pattern13, displacement should therefore again primarily 
affect the Y axis (capturing this lifting or lowering of the hand towards the target or away from the obstacle), but 
not the X-axis (indexing a displacement forwards/backwards to the alternative trajectory).
Y axis. If intentionality is perceptually instantiated, we predicted (1) that inefficient actions would be per-
ceptually “corrected” towards the more efficient action alternative, and (2) that these biases should be strongest 
in experimental group 1 (hand stimuli) but weaker when cues to intentionality are removed in groups 2 (balls 
with biological motion) and 3 (balls with non-biological motion). Indeed, the analysis revealed the interaction of 
Trajectory and Efficiency (F(1,79) = 45.0, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.363), replicating our prior study13. Across groups, the 
disappearance points for straight trajectories were reported higher when the actions were inefficient (i.e. reaching 
towards an obstacle, 2.26 px) than when the actions were efficient (no obstacle, −0.967 px; t(81) = 5.46, p < 0.001, 
d = 0.60). Conversely, the perceived disappearance points for arched reaches were perceived to be lower for inef-
ficient actions (7.87 px) than for efficient actions (11.6 px; t(81) = 4.81, p < 0.001, d = 0.53).
Importantly, as predicted, these biases differed between experimental groups, as indicated by an interaction 
of Trajectory, Efficiency and Experimental group (F(1,79) = 6.47, p = 0.002, ηp2 = 0.141). Pairwise step-down 
comparisons showed that the interaction between Trajectory and Efficiency was smaller in the Non-biological 
Ball group (group 3) than in the Biological Hand group (group 1; F(1,53) = 11.7, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.181), and the 
Biological Ball group (group 2; F(1,51) = 4.00, p = 0.051, ηp2 = 0.073). No difference was found between Biological 
Hand group and the Biological Ball group (F(1,54) = 2.77, p = 0.102, ηp2 = 0.049), although a Two One-Sided 
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Tests (TOST) procedure67 indicated that the observed effect size (d = 0.45) was not significantly within the 
equivalence bounds of ΔL = −0.53 and ΔU = 0.53, t(53.85) = −0.31, p = 0.38 (equivalence bounds calculated 
as critical Cohen’s d-values from our prior study13 investigating the same effect67). When experimental groups 
were analysed separately, the interaction between Trajectory and Efficiency was only present for the groups see-
ing Hands and Balls on biological motion trajectories (Biological Hand: F(1,28) = 41.7, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.598; 
Biological Ball: F(1,26) = 21.0, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.447), but not in the group viewing balls on a non-biological 
motion trajectory (Non-biological Ball: F(1,25) = 1.20, p = 0.284, ηp2 = 0.046). Indeed, the TOST procedure indi-
cated that the observed effect size in the latter group (d = 0.21) was significantly within the equivalence bounds of 
ΔL = −0.55 and ΔU = 0.55, t(25) = −1.71, p = 0.05.
As unpredicted effects are subject to alpha inflation in an ANOVA due to multiple testing68 all additional 
results in the analysis of Y-Axis and X-Axis should be interpreted with caution, and considered relative to a 
Bonferroni-adjusted alpha of 0.004. The analysis revealed an additional main effect of Trajectory that passed this 
threshold (F(1,79) = 197.5, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.714), with perceived disappearance points of stimuli on arched tra-
jectories being displaced further upwards (9.76 px, t(81) = 9.72, p < 0.001, d = 1.1) than for straight trajectories 
(0.67 px). This bias is consistent with the well-known predictive displacement in the direction of motion (e.g. 
further upwards for arched trajectories, but not for straight ones), known as the representational momentum 
effect. Interestingly, this forward displacement again differed between experimental groups, as indicated by an 
interaction of Trajectory and Experimental group that passed corrected thresholds (F(1,79) = 40.4, p < 0.001, 
ηp2 = 0.506). Direct comparisons showed that the upwards displacements for arched trajectories were larger in 
Non-biological Ball (group 3) than the Biological Ball group (group 2; F(1,51) = 12.9, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.203), 
which in turn were larger than in the Biological Hand group (group 1; F(1,54) = 31.9, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.371). 
When analysing each experimental group separately, the upwards shift of straight trajectories was only present 
with ball stimuli, both when following biological, (F(1,26) = 100.5, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.794), and non-biological 
trajectories, (F(1,79) = 147.7 p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.855), but not with moving hands, (F(1,28) = 2.35, p = 0.136, 
ηp2 = 0.077). While not explicitly predicted, these displacements may reflect further changes to motion prediction 
depending on the presence of intentional cues. Balls, especially those that do not follow a biological motion tra-
jectory, would be expected to continue on their upwards path, but hands would not when the goal of the reach is 
located towards the bottom, such as here. Nevertheless, due to the post-hoc nature of these findings, they should 
be treated with caution.
X axis. We did not have any prediction for the X axis. All effects are therefore subject to alpha inflation in an 
ANOVA68 and should be interpreted with caution, relative to a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha of 0.00468. A main 
effect of Trajectory, (F(1,79) = 199.0, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.716), passed this threshold, which was further qualified 
by an interaction of Trajectory and Experimental group (F(1,79) = 112.9, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.741). As can be seen 
in Fig. 2, perceptual judgments of hands – but not balls – on arched trajectories were generally biased leftwards 
and rightwards for hands on straight trajectories. This difference replicates previous results13 and simply reflects 
stimulus differences between the hand shapes of the naturally recorded reaches on straight and arched trajecto-
ries, specifically the further rightwards centre of gravity for hands on straight trajectories, which biases location 
judgments69. No other effects passed the Bonferroni-adjusted thresholds of 0.004. Specifically, there was no main 
effect of Efficiency (F(1,79) = 0.4.66, p = 0.034, ηp2 = 0.056), no interaction between Efficiency and Experimental 
group (F(1,79) = 5.42, p = 0.006, ηp2 = 0.121), no interaction between Trajectory and Efficiency (F(1,79) = 5.15, 
p = 0.026, ηp2 = 0.061) and no three-way interaction between Trajectory, Efficiency and Experimental group 
(F(1,79) = 1.25, p = 0.293, ηp2 = 0.031).
Testing for general differences in attention between groups. In an exploratory analysis, we tested 
whether the observed differences between groups can be explained by more general differences in attention 
towards the biological and non-biological stimuli. In particular, it is well-established that agentive stimuli with 
a biological motion profile attract attention70–72. To ensure that our results cannot be explained simply by more 
attentive perception of the more biological stimuli, we used the across-trial correlations between actual disap-
pearance points and participants’ judgments that we used to identify participants that did not follow the task (i.e. 
if the reported x coordinates did not bear enough relationship to the actual coordinates). If participants attend 
more strongly to biological stimuli than to non-biological stimuli, one would expect their judgements to be more 
accurate and to more closely follow what was observed, resulting in smaller deviations for biological hand stimuli 
than for the other, less intentional stimulus types. We found no evidence for this prediction. While these correla-
tions were generally high, they were, if anything, higher in the ball conditions in which participants’ judgments 
are less affected by their expectations (Hands, mean x r = 0.91, mean y r = 0.88; biological ball, mean x r = 0.95, 
mean y r = 0.93; non-biological ball, mean x r = 0.92, mean y r = 0.90). While this runs counter to the argument 
for decreased attention in the non-biological conditions, it is fully in line with our proposal of a stronger reliance 
on prior expectations as soon as intentions can be attributed to these stimuli. Indeed, as predicted from this 
hypothesis, participants’ across-trial correlations between actual and selected coordinates correlated negatively 
with how much they are affected by their expectations (r = −0.30, p = 0.006), even when gross between-groups 
differences are factored out via z standardization in each group (r = −0.31, p = 0.005). Thus, across all participants 
in the three groups, differences in the ability to track the actual disappearance points do no provide evidence for 
higher attention in the hand conditions but show, if anything, better accuracy in the non-biological groups, which 
can be explained by an (over-) reliance on prior expectations for stimuli that provide intentional cues.
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Discussion
Previous studies have shown that perceptual representations of observed actions are predictively biased towards 
the goals attributed to them37,41,42,46–48 and that these predictions are informed by the assumption of efficient 
action, reflecting the specific trajectories that would allow an actor to efficiently reach the inferred goal13. To 
investigate if these prior expectations emerge from assumptions about action intentionality, we asked participants 
to watch moving stimuli and to accurately report the object’s last seen position after it suddenly disappeared. We 
tested whether perceptual reports would again be predictively biased towards the expected trajectory13,37,41,42 but 
varied whether the stimulus was a hand with biological motion kinematics (i.e. bell-shaped velocity profile of 
reaching60), a non-agentive ball that travelled the same biological motion trajectory as the hand, or a ball travel-
ling a non-biological trajectory.
Replicating our prior studies, perceptual reports of hand disappearance points were not veridical, but “cor-
rected” towards the expected action kinematics of a rational, efficient actor. The perceived disappearance points 
of hands reaching straight towards an obstacle were reported higher than if the path was clear. Similarly, the 
perceived disappearance point of arched reaches was perceived lower if there was no obstacle to reach across, 
compared to when there was an obstacle. Importantly, our new data now show that these biases towards effi-
cient action depend on cues to intentionality. The biases were numerically reduced when participants watched a 
non-intentional object – a ball – travel on the same biological motion trajectory, starting slowly and speeding up 
along, as if self-propelled. They were almost completely eliminated when the same ball was now seen travelling 
with a non-biological trajectory that nevertheless traversed, on average, the same path of motion as the hands, but 
did not show the characteristic bell-shaped velocity profile of goal-directed reaches60.
These results confirm first that, as in our prior studies, observers predict the ideal action trajectory a rational 
actor would take that is fully aware of all relevant environmental constraints. Second, they show that these pre-
dictions influenced the perceptual judgments of observed actions, subtly biasing them towards the most efficient 
trajectory. These findings are therefore in line with predictive processing models of social perception12,15–17,26,41,42, 
which assume that the perceptual experience of others’ actions emerges from an integration of bottom-up sensory 
information and prior assumptions about others’ goals and how they would (best) realise them. Our data now 
Figure 2. The Trajectory X Efficiency interactions for the Biological Hand (A), Biological Ball (B), and Non-
biological Ball (C) groups. The difference between the real final position and the selected final position is plotted 
for the X axis and Y axis. The real final position on any given trial is at point 0,0, as indicated on each plot. Panel 
D depicts a comparison of the size of the Y axis interaction in pixels, equivalent to the total amount by which 
inefficient actions were corrected towards a more efficient trajectory. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals.
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show, third, that when observing the behaviour of others these predictions of efficient action depend on bottom-up 
cues to intentionality derived from the objects’ semantics and its trajectory and motion profile. Both types of 
cues have been previously identified as a basis for attributing intentionality to observed agents in children55–58. 
The finding that these cues also modulate predictive biases towards efficient action in adult action observation 
directly supports the proposal that these predictions emerge from the attribution of intention to the observed 
actions13,37,41,42, which then inform their perceptual representation.
During everyday action observation these top-down influences can fulfil several important functions. First, 
they can disambiguate perception by compensating for the perceptual “blurring” during motion perception (i.e. 
motion sharpening28,29), or filling in missing steps of the input30. Second they can support planning of one’s own 
actions, allowing them to be coordinated with the others’ future behaviour or the end-state of their actions73. 
Finally, they can be compared to actual behaviour, triggering revisions of prior assumptions if prediction errors 
become too large18,20, signalling, for example, that a behaviour may not be intentional after all, or that the actor is 
not aware of all relevant environmental constraints (e.g., they may not have seen an obstacle). As such, they may 
underlie the proposed link between teleological perception of others’ behaviour and more sophisticated theory of 
mind and mentalizing processes3.
Further work now needs to resolve via which mechanisms cues of intentionality induce predictive biases towards 
efficient action. One possibility is that the biases emerge via predictive mechanisms in one’s own motor system14–16,74,75. 
On such views, people make higher-level “cognitive” attributions of intentions of others and then feed these goals into 
their own motor system to predict the kinematics they would need to achieve if they were in the actor’s place. Indeed, 
the perceptual effects observed here bear a striking similarity to similar motoric effects that can be measured when 
people watch others’ behaviour. Both behavioural and neuroimaging studies suggest that, during action observation, 
one’s own motor system does not only mirror the actually seen behaviour (e.g. a finger being depressed) but also the 
behaviour that is only predicted from the goals attributed to the actor, even if it is not actually observed24,26 (e.g., finger 
held up by a clamp76). Even if one watches an inanimate ball that one has experience of controlling oneself, one’s motor 
behaviour subtly captures both the ball’s actual trajectory and the trajectory one intended for it to travel on77,78. These 
motoric changes might therefore index the recruitment of such predictive (forward modelling) mechanisms that have 
evolved for the control of one’s own actions but are applied to the actions of others.
An alternative possibility is that attributions of intentionality are made within the (higher-level) perceptual 
system itself. It is well-known that the perceptual system itself can make sophisticated “unconscious inferences” 
about objects, extracting, for example, the real colour of a stimulus by subtracting out cues to shading and illu-
mination79. In the same way, the perceptual system could use object and motion information (e.g., balls vs. 
hands; biological vs. non-biological motion profiles) to make inferences about the intentionality of a moving 
object80. Indeed, several imaging studies suggest that such cues to intentionality act on lower-level regions within 
higher-level visual cortex, such as the superior temporal sulcus81,82. Moreover, it well known that children can 
attribute intentionality to stimuli which are unlikely to engender motor activation, such as abstract geometric 
shapes or biomechanically impossible actions83,84 or that they process action efficiency before they have compe-
tence in the observed action85,86. Local interactions within the perceptual system could explain such observation. 
In such views, the motoric activation measured during action observation described above therefore does not 
reflect the origin of the perceptual effects, but a mere passive “motor resonance” that captures instead the changes 
to the action’s perceptual representation that has already occurred.
While we are sympathetic to both explanations12, and we do not deem them as mutually exclusive, our prior 
data seems to be more consistent with the latter, perceptual locus of effects. In our original study42, we observed 
that while attributing goals (e.g. to reach or withdraw) to others reliably biased perceptual measures towards these 
goals, the same was not true for when these action possibilities were motorically activated (i.e. by asking partic-
ipants to make a forward or backwards movement with their own hand). While this conclusion is certainly pre-
liminary, and needs to be supported by further studies, it makes a strong causal role of motoric processes unlikely.
Another question is how the present effects on perceptual judgments emerge. Several studies, both psycho-
physical and based on neuroimaging, have shown that predictions can exert downstream effects on early percep-
tual processes, across different modalities (e.g., vision30,33, audition22), providing sensory “templates” of expected 
stimulation33, or filling in missing information during apparent motion30,34. Others, however, argue that expec-
tations influence primarily decision-related processes that integrate bottom-up with top-down information on 
all levels of the hierarchy87,88, or that they reflect attentional modulations of the response properties of neurons 
in early sensory areas89,90. Others argue that many of the psychophysical effects of expectation may in fact reflect 
testing artefacts or demand effects, when participants realise what is being tested91,92.
While the precise mechanism has to be confirmed, several aspects of prior studies13 imply a role in the action’s 
perceptual representation. First, when asked during piloting of the original set of studies, participants were una-
ware of the experimental hypotheses, arguing against demand effects. Second, the effects were present already 
very briefly (250 ms) after action offset, in psychophysical probe judgment tasks13,37,41,42 (for a review of similar 
findings in non-biological motion perception, see40) that has been shown to be relatively robust against cognitive 
control processes93,94. Third, and most importantly, the biases towards efficient action were disrupted by brief 
(560 ms.) dynamic visual noise masks that interfere with the re-entrant feedback from higher cortical areas with 
visual cortex that is required for the stabilisation of percepts for conscious access, during both perception49,50,95,96 
and imagery97. The observed biases in perceptual judgments are therefore unlikely to stem from unspecific per-
ceptual changes in memory or motor control92 (see98 for an example for perceptual changes in action memory). 
Instead, we propose that they either play a role in ongoing motion perception emerging from the re-current 
interactions between lower and higher visual regions involved in stabilising percepts and compensating for the 
substantial blurring during motion perception.
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Conclusions
The principle of efficient action allows observers to predict ideal reference trajectories that intentional actions 
will follow, given that the agent is fully aware of all relevant environmental constraints. The data presented here 
confirm that these predictions are at least partially perceptually represented and influence perceptual judgments 
of others actions, biasing them towards these expectations. They show that these predictions emerge from attri-
butions of intentionality to the observed actor, triggered by the perception of biological “agentive” objects and 
kinematics that follow biological motion profiles.
Data Availability
Data, code and materials are available at https://osf.io/x53uj/.
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